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Abstract: Let Y be a topological space of non-cooperative games and let F be the map defined on Y 
such that F(y) is the set of all Nash equilibria of a game y. We are interested in finding conditions 
on the games which guarantee the upper semicontinuity of  the map F. This property of F is a first 
requirement in order to study the existence of a dense subset Z of Y such that any game y belonging 
to Z has the following stability property: any Nash equilibria of the game y can be approached by 
Nash equilibria of a net of games converging to y. 
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1. Introduction. 
Let S1,…,Sn be non-empty sets and let f1,…,fn be real valued functions defined on the Cartesian 
product of the sets S1,…,Sn. The list of data y=(S1,…,Sn, f1,…,fn) is an n-player non-cooperative 
game: for any { }ni ,...,1∈ , Si is the set of strategies of the player i and fi is the payoff function. If 
player 1 chooses the strategy x1, player 2 chooses the strategy x2 and so on, the corresponding 
outcomes of the game are: f1(x1,x2,…,xn) for player 1,  f2(x1,x2,…,xn) for player 2,…, fn(x1,x2,…,xn) 
for player n. A list of strategies x= (x1,x2,…,xn) is said to be a profile of strategies, and a profile of 
strategies x* is said to be a Nash equilibrium (see Nash (1950)) if, for any player i, fi(x*)≥fi(xi,x*-i) 
for all xi belonging to Si, where (xi,x*-i) means (x*1,…, x*i-1, xi, x*i+1,…, x*n). Now, let Y be a set of 
non-cooperative n-player games endowed with a topology. Following Yu (1999), given a game y, 
we say that a Nash equilibrium x of the game y is essential if for any neighbourhood O of x there 
exists a neighbourhood N of y such that any game y’ belonging to N has at least a Nash equilibrium 
x’ which belongs to O; moreover, we say that the game y is essential  if any Nash equilibrium of y is 
essential. As one can see, the idea of essentiality concerns a notion of stability under perturbations 
on the data. Before to explain this, let us recall some definitions in the setting of set-valued analysis. 
Let F be a set-valued function (also said a map) defined on Y with values in X. We say that F is 
upper semicontinuous (see, for example, Aliprantis and Border (1999)) at y∈Y if for any open set O 
containing F(y) there exists a neighbourhood N of y such that F(y’)⊆O for any y’∈Y; we say that F 
is lower semicontinuous at y if for any x∈F(y) and any open neighbourhood O of x there exists a 
neighbourhood N of  y such that F(y’)∩O is non-empty for any y’ belonging to N. Now, if F is the 
map defined on a space of games Y such that F(y) is the set of Nash equilibria of y,  then the game y 
is essential if and only if the map F is lower semicontinuous at y. So, the existence of essential 
game is nothing but the existence of point of the topological space Y in which the set-valued 
function F is lower semicontinuous. A crucial aid is the following theorem, due to Fort (1950): 
 
Theorem 1. Let F be a set-valued function defined on Baire space Y with non-empty and compact 
values in a metric space X. If F is upper semicontinuous at any point of Y, then there exists a subset 
Z of Y which is dense and such that F is also lower semicontinuous at any point of Z. 
 
In light of this theorem, if the topological space of games Y is a Baire space (for the definition of 
Baire spaces see, for example, Aliprantis and Border (1999)) and the space of profiles of strategies 
is metric, the existence of essential games is guaranteed by conditions  which allow the map F to be 
upper semicontinuous. The focus of this note is just to show under which conditions, remarkable in 
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the framework of strategic choices and weaker than continuity of payoffs,  the map F is upper 
semicontinuous with non-empty and compact values. 
 
2. Preliminaries. 
In order to obtain that the set-valued function F satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 1, by using 
conditions over the payoffs of games weaker than continuity, let us remind a recent generalization 
of the continuity of real valued function: see Morgan and Scalzo (2007). 
 
Definition 1. Let f be a real valued function defined on a topological space X and let x0 ∈X. We say 
that the function f is upper pseudocontinuous at x0 if 
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for any Xx ∈1 such that )()( 10 xfxf < . The function f is said to be lower pseudocontinuous at x0 if 
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for any Xx ∈1 such that )()( 01 xfxf < . Finally, f is said to be pseudocontinuous at x0 if it is both 
upper and lower pseudocontinuous. 
 
The class of pseudocontinuous functions play a role in Choice Theory. In fact, as shown in Morgan 
and Scalzo (2007), if a continuous preference relation defined on a topological space – that is a 
complete and transitive binary relation such that the upper level sets and the lower level sets are 
closed – is endowed of numerical representations (also said utility functions), then all such 
representations are pseudocontinuous functions. So, pseudocontinuity is the common topological 
property among the numerical representations of continuous preference relations. 
When a game y=(S1,…,Sn, f1,…,fn) has the sets Si compact and convex and the functions fi 
pseudocontinuous on nSS ××…1  and such that ),( ii xf −⋅  is quasi-concave for any ix−  and any i, 
then, in light of Theorem 3.2 in Morgan and Scalzo (2007), y admits Nash equilibria. So, from now 
on, let Y be the set of all games y=(S1,…,Sn, f1,…,fn) having the sets of strategies S1,…,Sn non-empty, 
compact, convex and included, respectively, in the subsets X1,…,Xn of normed spaces, and the 
payoff functions fi are pseudocontinuous and bounded on nXXX ××= …1  and such that ),( ii xf −⋅  
is quasi-concave for any ix− . Now, we introduce a suitable topology on Y: following Yu (1999), we 
first consider the metric on the space of all vector functions ),,( 1 nfff …= , with nff ,,1 …  
pseudocontinuous and bounded on X, defined as follows: 
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then , if iK  denote the set of all non-empty, compact and convex subset of Xi, for any i, we take the 
Vietoris’ topology (see Klein and Thopson (1984)) on iK  and so the topology σ  on 
nKKK ××= …1  which is the product of the Vietoris’ topologies on any iK . Finally, we obtain a 
topology τ  on Y as the product of σ  and the topology induced by the metric ρ . 
 
3. The results. 
Let XYF 2: →  be the set-valued function such that F(y) is the set of all Nash equilibria of the 
game y, where Y is defined as in the previous section. We have the following result: 
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Theorem 2. The set-valued function F has non-empty and compact values and is upper 
semicontinuous with respect to the topology τ , that is: if an open set O contains the set of Nash 
equilibria F(y) of a game y and if ( )ααy  is a net of games converging to y in the topology τ ,  then 
we have OyF ⊆)( α  for any game αy  with 0αα ;  for a suitable index 0α . 
 
The proof of Theorem 2 can be achieved by the arguments of the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Scalzo 
(2008). Let us remark that a previous result on the upper semicontinuity of the set-valued function F 
is given in Yu (1999) in the case in which the payoffs of any game are continuous functions. Here, 
we not only generalize the previous result, but we also obtain a result by using an ordinal 
topological property, that is the pseudocontinuity.  
Theorem 2 can be used in order to state that there exist essential games with pseudocontinuous 
payoff functions. In fact, if we recognize a non-empty subset 1Y  of Y such that 1Y  is a Baire space, 
from Theorem 2 we know that F is upper semicontinuous on 1Y  and from Theorem 1 we know that 
there exists a subset 1YZ ⊆  which is dense – that is: the topological closure of Z coincides with 1Y  
– and such that the map F is also lower semicontinuous at z for any Zz∈ , which means that any 
game Zz∈  is essential. 
Obviously, the pseudocontinuity is not the only generalization of ordinal character of the continuity 
in the setting of non-cooperative games. An other remarkable class of discontinuous games is the 
class of better-reply secure games, due to Reny (1999): a game y=(S1,…,Sn, f1,…,fn) is said to be 
better-reply secure if for any pair ( )** ,ux  such that *x  is not a Nash equilibrium of y and *u  
belongs to the closure of the graph of the vector function ( )nff ,...,1 , then some player i has a 
strategy ^ix  such that ε+>− *^ ),( iiii uxxf  for all ix−  belonging in some neighbourhood of *ix− , 
where ε  is a suitable positive real number. We remark that any game with pseudocontinuous payoff 
functions is also a better-reply secure: see Proposition 4.1 in Morgan and Scalzo (2007). 
Hence a question arises: Does the thesis of Theorem 2 hold for the class of better-reply secure 
games? The answer of the question is in the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 3. Let Y1 be the set of all better-reply secure games with spaces of strategies included, 
respectively, in X1,…,Xn, and let XYF 2: 11 →  be the set-valued function such that F(y) is the set of 
Nash equilibria of y – in light of Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999), F(y) is non-empty and compact. Then, 
there exist a game 1Yy∈ , an open set O containing )(1 yF  and a net of games αα )(y  converging to 
y such that OyF \)(1
α  is non-empty for any α  - in other words, the map F1 is not upper 
semicontinuous at y. 
 
For a sketch of proof, it is sufficient to consider the game ),,,( 2121 ffSSG =  and the sequence of 
games ),,,( 2121
nnnnn ffSSG =  such that: ]1,0[21 == SS , ⎥⎦
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